Repayment Burdens with US College Loans by Bruce Chapman & Kiatanantha Lounkaewa
   
 
The Australian National University 





Repayment Burdens with US College Loans 
 
 














ISBN: 978-1-921693-28-1 1 
 
Repayment Burdens with US College Loans  
 
Bruce Chapman
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theoretical and empirical perspectives, the major goal being to understand the interaction 
between loan design and occupational choices. We find compelling original evidence that the 
design of US loans imposes severe expected hardships for many borrowers, especially those 
with very high debts, such as lawyers. The case for policy reform towards graduates’ capacity 
to repay seems incontestable. (JEL H28, I22, I28, J24) 
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Repayment Burdens with US College Loans  
 
          The design of student loan schemes is critical to their success, with one of the most 
important aspects being the extent of loan repayment burdens faced by graduates. Repayment 
burdens relate to the financial difficulties associated with debtors meeting loan obligations 
and is the subject of this paper. In historical context we note that as long ago as 1993 
President Bill Clinton
1 promoted changes to US student loans with a so-called “income based 
repayment” option, designed to take into account graduates’ capacity to repay student debt, 
saying: 
A student torn between pursuing a career in teaching or corporate law, for example, 
[should] be able to make a career choice based on what he or she wants to do, not 
how much he or she can earn to pay off the college debt.
2 
     In essence this was recognition of the fact that for many graduates at the time the burdens 
of student loan repayments were affecting career choices, away from public sector and 
community jobs and towards employment in which the earnings were sufficiently high to 
facilitate debt servicing (Chapman, 2006). In acknowledgement of the problem, several 
prominent law schools, including those from Georgetown and Duke Universities, and NYU, 
developed Law School Loan Repayment Assistance Programs (LRAP) in which law 
graduates are offered loan relief conditional on community or public sector employment.  
     It is extraordinary to record that the number of law schools involved in LRAP has now 
grown to 100
3, implying strongly that the significance of repayment burdens with respect to 
career choices has expanded significantly. Indeed, Field (2009) documents the fact that large 
numbers of law graduates do not consider public sector employment because of this problem. 
Clearly then, rather than being addressed successfully through changes to student loan policy, 
the problem for many law graduates has become more severe. 
          Less attention has been given to what repayment burden issues might mean for the 
training of other groups, such as teachers, perhaps because the debts of members of this 
group are likely to be relatively low. However, repayment burdens are a function of both 
debts and incomes, and we note that in 2010 teacher annual starting salaries are both 
                                                 
1 Bill Clinton’s personal student loan experience involved him being part of the Yale College Deferred 
Payments Plan in the early 1970s, the first income contingent loan scheme (Palacios, 2004; Chapman, 2006). 
2 President Bill Clinton Radio Address to the Nation (1 May 1993). 
3 See Equal Justice Works (2010). 
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relatively low and differ between as much as $50,111 in New Jersey and $30,375 for South 
Dakota.
4 There is potential then that decisions concerning professional employment with 
respect to school teaching are also affected by loan repayment burdens. 
     We offer a special contribution to these matters through the provision of new information 
on the incidence and extent of loan repayment burdens. This is addressed through considering 
empirically the implications of Stafford loans, the most commonly used student financing 
instrument for college students in the US. There are three contributions in what follows. 
     First,  in  the  literature  there  is  a  paucity of modeling designed to make explicit the 
relationship between repayment burdens and the life-time welfare of the borrower. We 
supplement existing utility-maximizing loan approaches by analyzing the conceptual inter-
relationships involving contributions to the extent and size of student loan repayment burdens, 
such as: expected incomes; the size of the loan; the rate of interest on the loan; the time 
required to repay in full; and the individual’s rate of time preference. The analysis is then 
extended to allow insights into the connection between career choices and repayment burdens. 
     Second, for the first time we estimate the probability that students face concerned with 
future repayment difficulties. This highlights the potential benefits associated with a different 
approach to loan collection which takes into account capacity to repay loans, such as through 
income contingent collection. There are elements of the US student loan debate, and on-going 
changes to Stafford loan collection, which attempt to take into account the potential benefits 
of income contingency but these have not been institutionalized as yet in a way that 
accurately reflects this need, a point considered further below (Chapman and Shavit, 2010). 
     Third, a major empirical contribution is the computation and presentation of repayment 
burden calculations well beyond what has typically been used in the literature, which has 
until now only reported ratios of repayments with respect to average graduate incomes 
(Ziderman, 2003), or hypothetically constructed illustrations of ratios for low income debtors 
(Baum and Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz and Finnie, 2002). Instead we use unconditional 
quantile regression to estimate repayment burdens across the entire range of debtor’s incomes 
by age, using actual rather than hypothetical data and with reference to the occupations of 
both lawyer and teachers. We find that a significant number of borrowers face very high 
repayment burdens at some stages during their working lives, with attendant consumption 
hardships and elevated default probabilities; this must impact upon educational and career 
choices. 
                                                 




     Our approach should be seen to be complementary to the analysis of Rothstein and Rouse 
(2007), which sets out to test directly the career choices/student debt nexus with reference to 
an unusual panel survey from a single higher education institution in the 2000s. A 
particularly useful contribution is the support found for the direct test of the proposition that 
students with higher levels of debt are more likely to undertake employment in jobs with 
relatively high starting salaries. The lack of similar studies highlights the value of the current 
exercise, since the evidence we are providing allows a generalization of the issues. 
     The  policy  consequences  are  potentially profound. Prospective students expecting a 
combination of relatively high debts and low earnings might as a result decide to avoid 
college, or to choose jobs with higher projected earnings than are available in community or 
government sectors. Faced with these concerns governments might attempt to modify loan 
policies to take account of potential repayment burdens, such as with so-called income based 
repayment (IBR) arrangements for US college loans, which were extended in 2010. 
     On this last issue a significant point with respect to the recent IBR reforms is that if 
repayment burdens are sufficiently important to call into question the basis of Stafford loans 
this constitutes a case for a future critical analysis of the right forms that income contingent 
collection might take. A critical secondary question is whether or not IBR is the correct 
direction for policy reform to take (see Chapman and Shavit, 2010).  
  
I.  Motivating Analysis of Repayment Burdens 
 
A. What Is a Loan Repayment Burden? 
 
     Education economists and others have examined the concept and implications of student 
loan repayment burdens for more than a quarter of a century.
5  Defined simply in a 
comparative static context, a loan repayment burden is the proportion of a person’s income 
that needs to be allocated to service a debt per period, or, formally: 
 
(1)     Loan repayment in period t
Repayment burden in period t =
Income in period t
. 
                                        
                                                 
5 See Woodhall (1987), Ziderman (1999), Schwartz and Finnie (2002), Salmi (2003) and Baum and Schwartz (2006). 
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     There are several policy design issues usually raised with respect to repayment burdens. 
The first is motivated by the importance of difficulties faced by debtors in meeting their 
obligations, it obviously being the case that - in a world in which borrowing against expected 
future earnings is difficult
6 - the higher is a debtor’s repayment burden the less consumption 
and/or savings are possible at any given income. This is of importance in comparisons of 
different student loan policies: specifically, Stafford student loans are quite different to 
income contingent loans in this respect. This is due to the fact that the latter are explicitly 
designed to avoid high repayment burdens and this is achieved through per period debt 
servicing obligations being capped by legislation (Chapman and Lounkaew, 2010).
7 
          A second is that greater repayment burdens are associated with higher prospects that 
debtors will be forced to default on loan repayments because of low incomes. This issue is 
substantiated by the finding of Dynarski (1994) and Gross, Cekic, Hossler and Hillman 
(2009) that student loan defaulters in the US are much more likely to have low levels of 
income. Typically student loan schemes (such as Stafford loans) come with a government 
guarantee to cover the debts when a student defaults,
8 which means that taxpayers pay. An 
associated policy mechanism relates to the provision of interest rate subsidies on student 
loans,
9   which are presumably designed to diminish consumption hardship and default 
probabilities. 
     Woodhall  (1987)  integrates  these  concerns by stressing that governments face an 
balancing act in the design of mortgage-type loan schemes. Specifically, ceteris paribus, the 
lower are interest rate subsidies the higher will be repayment burdens. The design 
complexities don’t end with this obvious trade-off because the lower are interest rate 
subsidies the greater is the prospect of default, with this adding to taxpayer contributions. 
     Important research is provided by Shen and Ziderman (2009) which offers calculations of 
taxpayer interest rate subsidies for a large number of student loan schemes from many 
countries, and Schwartz and Finnie (2002) which presents repayment burdens for 
hypothetical debtors in the Canada Student Loans scheme. As well, Chapman, Lounkaew, 
Polsiri, Sarachitti and Sitthipongpanich (2010) illustrates taxpayer subsidies associated with 
                                                 
6  The issue of credit constraints is critical in understanding repayment burdens and is addressed in Rothstein 
and Rouse (2007) and Chapman (2006). 
7 In the Australian income contingent college loan scheme, for example, the maximum percentage of taxable income 
of the debt that is repaid is 8 per cent per annum. 
8 It is commonly understood that the commercial financing sector will not provide loans to students because of 
their lack of collateral in the event of default (Friedman, 1955; Barr, 2003; Chapman, 2006). 
9 For recent analyses see Ziderman (2003) and Chapman and Lounkaew (2010). 
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the Thai Student Loan Fund. With this as policy background we now examine several 
empirical aspects of the debate. 
 
B. Repayment Burdens: How Much Is Too Much? 
 
    Do we know what proportion of a debtor’s income repayment burdens should be limited 
to? A definition of what this means in practice is illusory, and different terms are used to 
imply similar debtor experiences.  
     For example, Woodhall (1987) uses the term “manageable debt” and suggests that this 
depends “…partly on the level and pattern of graduates’ expected earnings, and partly on 
what students and society regard as a “reasonable” level of debt” (page 15). Second, 
Ziderman (1999) suggests that loan conditions need to be set so as “…to avoid imposing 
unduly harsh repayment burdens on borrowers…” (page 82). Third, Baum and Schwartz 
(2006) argues that the policy design issue is to avoid repayments which would “…impose too 
heavy a burden on young people leaving school.” (page 1).  
     Clearly  there  is  not  an  agreed  definition for assessing what constitutes an excessive 
repayment burden, but there are nevertheless several different pointers for understanding 
what this might be in practice. The following provide useful indications of a range of views: 
(i)  “A rough yardstick, used in several countries, is that loan repayments should not 
exceed 8 to 10% of a graduate’s income, and that this should determine the 
maximum debt that students may incur” (Woodhall,1987, page 15); and 
(ii)  Salmi (2003) notes that in Venezuala the government loan agency “…has 
established 15 per cent as the ceiling for monthly repayments.” (page 15), and 
goes on to suggest that “Experience shows that no repayment schedule can be 
sustainable when the monthly debt exceeds 18 per cent of income”. 
     The most comprehensive analysis is in Baum and Schwartz (2006), which refers to the so-
called “8 percent rule”, a standard suggesting that “…students should not devote more than 8 
per cent of their gross income to repayment of student loans.” (page 2).  Their paper quotes 
an extensive literature in support, albeit recognizing the range of suggested boundaries.  
     However, an obvious point is that if a person’s income is very high even a relatively high 
percentage of this income being used for loan repayment may not constitute a concern. Thus 
an important point is that if there is a consensus world-wide that it is undesirable for 
repayment burdens to be higher than, say, 8 – 18 per cent of a debtor’s income, because 
graduate earnings in the US are relatively high, Stafford repayment burdens could be 
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considered to be excessive at the highest point of the range, and in what follows we use a 
cutoff of 18 per cent. We stress that there remains no objective rule. 
 
C.  Measuring Expected Incomes in Calculations of Repayment Burdens 
 
     The denominator of equation (1), the per-period income received by student loan debtors, 
is critical to the exercise. An important point is that significant research so far has used very 
aggregate proxies of incomes, such as that received by graduates on average. Ziderman 
(2003), for example, in an analysis of the repayment burdens associated with the Thai Student 
Loan Fund, compared debt servicing obligations to the earnings of graduates using 
predictions from Thai earnings functions.  
     From this Ziderman concludes that “The annual repayment burden in terms of annual 
income is very light, in the region of only 2-4 per cent annually” (page 83), and adds that 
“…the Thai student loan scheme is overly generous…which may be effortlessly repaid out of 
higher income received on courses of schooling.” (page 83). However, beyond average 
graduate earnings there are wide dispersions of income received by graduates, a fact 
highlighted by the relatively low explanatory power for these models.
10 Like many issues in 
economics, some of the most interesting empirical aspects concern the tail of the distributions.  
     Chapman  et al. (2010) analyse earnings distributions of Thai graduates and find that 
repayment burdens differ by extraordinarily high amounts; the range is between 1 per cent for 
the top 25 per cent of earners and 70 per cent for the bottom 10 per cent of earners. This is a 
significant point for what follows since we focus on the distributions of graduate earnings and 
what this means for our understanding of US repayment burdens. But before examining the 
data we model the conceptual bases of repayment burdens.  
 
II. Formal Analysis of Repayment Burdens 
 
A. A Two-Period Model 
 
     Rothstein and Rouse (2007) and Field (2009) formulate utility maximizing frameworks 
concerning the impact of loan levels on career choices, but these models do not address 
directly the links between loan design, repayment burdens and career choices. To consider 
                                                 
10 For example, Chapman and Lounkaew (2010) found R
2 of around 0.4 for Thai earning functions; a plethora of other 
earnings function studies typically explain no more than 20-30 per cent of the variance. 
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this and help motivate the empirical exercises we analyse repayment burdens using a two-
period utility maximizing model; this highlights the importance of both interest rates and loan 
size in determining the welfare of borrowers. Following Lawrence (1995), the life-time 
welfare of a borrow is 
 
(2)           12 1 2 (,,) () Wcc uc EUc   ,        
 
where   is the life-time welfare of a borrower;  and  are consumption in periods 1 and 
2; and 
(.) W 1 c 2 c
  is the subjective rate of time preference. It is assumed that the utility function is 
concave, that is   and  , (.) 0 u  (.) 0 u 
11 and that the borrower enters tertiary education in 
period 1 financed by period 1 income, 1 y , and a student loan of size  .   l
    We show below that the extent of repayment burdens will be influenced by interest rates, 
and in this context it is of policy relevance to note that it is common for student loan schemes 
to have built-in subsidies which take the form of less than full interest rates being charged for 
the whole period of the loan (Ziderman, 2003; Shen and Ziderman, 2009; Chapman and 
Lounkaew, 2010).
12  The interest rate subsidy s(r,T) can be formalized as follows: 
 








   ,          
                                                                                     
where  is the total loan disbursed; the government cost of borrowing is  ; r is the real 
rate of interest charged on the loan; T is the length of loan repayment; and 
l  γ 0,1 
t R  is the 
repayment required to service the loan at time t.  
     With two periods and a fixed cost of borrowing to the government, interest rate subsidies 
can be expressed as a function only of the real interest rate charged. Thus, by simplifying 
equation (3), the amount of the loan recovered is: 
 
                                                 
11 To rule out corner solutions we impose the further restriction that  (0) u   . 
12 By adding administrative cost and defaults the total unrecoverable part of the loan we can compute what is 
called the hidden grant (Ziderman, 2003; Shen and Ziderman, 2009). Shen and Ziderman (2009) reports the 
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     Let  1 y  be gross income in period 1 which is known to the borrower and  2 y  be the period 2 
gross income with expected value and variance being given by   and  2 ( Ey)
2  . Consumption 
in each period is constrained by disposable income: 
 
(5.1)     Period  1:    11 cyl   ;                                                                                             
(5.2)           Period 2:     1( ) s r 22 cy l   .          
                              
Substituting (5.1) and (5.2) into (2) yields  
 
(6)        12 11 22 (,,, , ) ( ) ( 1 ( )) Wyy lr uy l Eu y sr l         .     
                                               
          Equation (6) recasts the maximization problem in relation to income, the amount 
borrowed to finance higher education, and the level of the interest rate subsidy. Applying a 
second order Taylor approximation around the mean of the expected utility function in the 
second period,
13 the life-time utility function can be approximated by: 
 
(7)   
'' 2
12 1 1 22 22
1
(,() ,, , ) ( ) ( ()1 ( )) ( ()1 ( ))
2
WyEy lr u y l u Ey sr l u Ey sr l               
.          
      
     In summary, this section has modeled life-time welfare in the presence of student loans 
allows us to develop empirical predictions in a comparative static context. 
 
B. Comparative Static Analysis of Repayment Burdens 
 
     Following equation (1), the repayment burden  t RB  is defined as the ratio between the 
repayments required and total income in period t:  
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By normalizing total disposable income for each period by gross income in that period, 
equation (7) can be expressed as: 
 
    '' 2
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     Holding expected income in period 2 constant, a higher interest rate increases repayment 
burdens, and thus lower the life-time welfare of debtors. Taking the partial derivative of 
equation (9) with respect to the real interest rate charged on the loan, and dropping the third 
order derivative yields: 
 
(10)                                    
2 (.) (.) ( )
0






.     
 
     The impact of a higher loan size on life-time welfare can be seen from equation (11). 
Partial derivative of the welfare with respect to the loan size shown in equation (11) reveals 
that the first term on the right hand side is positive and the total effect of the second term is 
negative, with the net effect depending on the relative gain through higher consumption in the 
first period and the utility cost from having less net income in the second period. A concave 
utility function implies that, for low income borrowers expecting to earn sufficiently high 
income in the second period, a higher loan size increases life-time welfare. For a borrower 
who expects period 2 income to be low, a higher loan size decreases life-time welfare 
because concavity the marginal disutility from lower net income in period 2 prevails over the 
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     An individual’s discount rate also plays an important part in determining the outcome. 
Two borrowers with the same income in period 1 with a similar period 2 income expectation, 
but with different subjective discount rates, value a higher loan size differently. A borrower 
who discounts the future more heavily may find increasing loan size to be welfare-improving, 
but those who place higher weight on future consumption will find the change to be welfare-
decreasing.  
     The model clarifies the relationship between repayment burdens and the life-time welfare 
of borrowers. Two important results emerge. First, holding constant loan size l, higher 
interest rates must increase repayment burden, and thus lower debtors’ welfare. Second, the 
effect of a higher loan size is ambiguous because while this increases first period welfare, it 
also lowers second period net income, with the net result depending on the relative effects on 
discounted utility in each period.  
 
C. Repayment Burdens and Career Choices 
 
     Based on the insights from Rothstein and Rouse (2007), this section extends the model 
developed above by making explicit the relationship between expected repayment burdens 
and career choices in a world in which there are non-wage job attributes. We add to the 
model the value of amenities, denoted by a, which is the extra utility gained from working in 
a job that possesses attractive non-wage characteristics, such as a public service contribution. 
It is assumed that amenities are traded off with wages and can thus be scaled in dollars terms 
as forgone income, with the upper bound of the choice set being denoted by  .  This means 
that the job in period 2 which offers amenity level a2 will have a total salary of 22 y a  . 
     To accommodate the role played by a trade-off between amenities and wages, Rothstein 
and Rouse (2007) assume that the post-university period can be broken down into two sub-
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periods, with borrowers paying off the loan in the second period and thus able to use all 
income on consumption in a third period. The optimal rule for inter-temporal consumption 
dictates that borrowers adjust their consumption to the point at which expected marginal 
utility in the second period equals the expected discounted marginal utility of the third period. 
This can be stated as follows: 
 
(12)                                                     222 333 (,) (,) . E Uca E Uca     
 
     Rothstein  and  Rouse  (2007)  show  both  formally and empirically that education debts 
matter for career choices if borrowers are credit-constrained, because credit constraints 
prevent borrowers from smoothing consumption between periods 2 and 3. The optimal 
consumption rule states that the expected marginal utility of consumption in period 2 after the 
debts have been repaid must equal the expected discounted marginal utility of consumption in 
period 3. Putting      22 2 1( ) 1( ) cy s r a s r       and 33 cy a 3    into the 
Rothstein and Rouse optimality condition, the consumption rule can be written as follows:  
 




          Normalizing each period by its income and using the definition of repayment burden 
discussed above, equation (13) can be written as: 
 
(14)                                                22 2 (1 ( , , , )) (1) EU R Bryla EU      
     . 
 
          For the equality in equation (14) to hold,  22 (, ,, ) 0 RB r y l a  . Since  22 (, ,, ) RBry la is 
increasing in a2, it follows that borrowers with high expected repayment burdens will choose 
a job with low amenity because of their need for higher income employment. The model 
predicts that, with credit constraints and a Stafford student loan, borrowers who expect to 
face high repayment burdens prefer low-amenity/higher wage private sector jobs. As will be 
illustrated empirically, the impact of repayment burdens on career choices is very significant 





D. The Modeling Results and Empirical Analysis of Repayment Burdens 
      
     This section developed a formal model to investigate the affect of repayment burdens on 
borrowers’ expected welfare. The model explains that repayment burdens diminish welfare 
through their reduction of net income available for consumption, meaning that higher 
repayment burdens make borrowers worse-off. Since repayment burdens are affected by both 
debt levels and expected incomes, the lower utility from this aspect of debt is expected for 
borrowers at lower levels of income distribution. 
     A critical consequence of high repayment burdens is their affect on the career choices of 
credit constrained borrowers. The empirical prediction from the above is that debtors will be 
more likely to seek employment in which they can command higher incomes, at a cost to 
them of lower amenity. While this prediction cannot be tested directly, comparisons of 
repayment burdens between alternative career choices are indicative of borrowers’ likely 
choice sets. We can now demonstrate empirically the importance of these propositions for 
different cases – typical graduates and teachers, and both public sector and private sector 
lawyers – in aggregate and for different expected income distributions. 
 
III.  Understanding Stafford Loans 
 
A.  Stafford Loan Rules 
 
     There  are  two  types  of  Stafford loans: subsidized and unsubsidized.
14  A subsidized 
Stafford loan is available to students with assessed financial needs based on information 
concerning household family incomes. With subsidized loans the federal government pays 
the interest (as long as the student is enrolled at least half-time) with repayments beginning 
after a six-month repayment grace period following graduation. The second type of loan, 
unsubsidized Stafford, is available to all full-time students regardless of financial need, with 
the interest being capitalized during study and with a six-month repayment grace period after 
graduation.  
     There are two principal repayment options for all Stafford loans. The first is a mortgage-
type standard repayment plan under which the student is required to repay a constant nominal 
                                                 
14 Data from National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (2010) reveals that about 35 per cent of enrolled 




amount per period. The other option is the graduated repayment plan, in which the repayment 
requirement increases step-wise every two years. For a debt of less than $30,000 both plans 
have a fixed repayment period of 10 years, but if the debt exceeds this amount the student 
qualifies for an extended repayment plan with a maximum period of 25 years.
15  
     Interest rates and the repayment conditions for Stafford Loans are shown in Table 1. 
  
TABLE 1−STAFFORD LOAN REPAYMENT CONDITIONS* 













Standard 0  5.6  6  10  Subsidized 
Graduated 0  5.6  6  10 
Standard 6.8  6.8  6  10  Unsubsidized 
Graduated 6.8  6.8  6  10 
*The interest rates are in nominal terms. 
 
B.  Stafford Debts: Levels and Repayments 
 
     An essential aspect of the calculation of repayment burdens concerns the numerator of 
equation (1), the amount of money required to service the debt per period, and this will 
depend on the size of the loan, the interest rates imposed and the length of the repayment 
period. Our analysis assumes an average loan size in 2010 for a typical university graduate 
(called “All Graduates”) at to be approximately $20,000 per degree
16 and the same loan size 
is assumed for graduates working as teachers (called “Teachers”). Also, following Schrag 
(2007), the total debt of law graduates debt is assumed to be $100,000. 
   Figure 1 illustrates repayment streams in real terms for the standard repayment plan for 
Unsubsidized Stafford loans with the debt levels assumed in this study.
17 While the 
                                                 
15As well, Stafford loans charge a 1 per cent origination and a 1 per cent guarantee fee. There is also an upfront 
rebate of 1.5 per cent which means that the net disbursement is 99.5 per cent of the gross loan amount. The 
borrower must make the first 12 payments on time to retain the rebate. 
16This figure is based on the estimate provided by FinAid (2010). FinAid’s estimate is based on data from the 
National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey 2007-2008. From the data used in the study, Field (2009) estimates 
an average loan size to be $20,000. 
17 Subsidized Stafford loan repayments of the same nominal level will be about 5 per cent per annum lower. 
Since the amount borrowed by law graduates exceeds the maximum limits of Subsidized Stafford, the 
repayment stream illustration combines both Unsubsidized and Subsidized Stafford. 
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repayment is fixed in nominal terms the real level of repayment declines as a result of CPI 
























     What follows describes the empirical methods employed in this study, which are used in 
an examination of two separate issues. The first is the probability that borrowers face difficult 
repayment burdens, defined as being equal to or in excess of 18 per cent. Second, we estimate 
the extent of repayment burdens for loan conditions defined above and for different 
assumptions lifetime earnings structures. Within this second category we examine age-
income profiles and distributions to measure the denominator of equation 1. 
 
A. Probability Distributions of Income 
 
     In order to get a broad handle on the likely incidence of problematic repayment burdens 
the first part of the exercise involves the calculation of probabilities that a borrower will 
experience repayment burdens of at least 18 per cent in any given year. Several approaches 
are available to carry out this exercise, for example simple ratios, non-parametric density 
estimates and parametric density estimates. The parametric approach is chosen because it is a 
standard tool exercises of this nature (Cowell, 2000).  We employ the Singh-Maddala 
                                                 
18 This is approximately the 15 year average of the US inflation rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). 
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distribution to approximate the income distribution of the borrowers’ cohort given that this 
calibration distribution outperforms lognormal and gamma distributions in approximating 
skewed income  distributions (Singh and Maddala, 1976; McDonald and Ransom, 1979; 














    
      
 
where a≥0, b≥0, q>1/a are parameters for random variable x, in this case income.  The shape 
of the distribution is determined by parameters a and q, while parameter b scales the 
distribution. By denoting z=1+(x/b)
a, the distribution function can be written as  F(x)=1-z
-q;  
the corresponding probability density function is then: 
 
(16)        
(1 ) (1 ) () ( ) .
qa aq x fx z bb
    
 
B.  Income Functions and Age-Income Profiles 
 
     For calculations of expected repayment burdens we need to estimates of expected graduate 
income paths, and for this we use variants of the standard earnings function of the following 
form:  
 
 (17)                                                                     
2
ij 0j 1j ij 2j ij lnI =β +β experience +β experience +ε , ij
 





I  is the sum of annual earnings, social security payments and unemployment 
insurance payouts of individual i, differentiated by sex; potential experience is defined as: 
 
(18)  Experience = age - time to complete a degree/dropout – age at which schooling  begins   
 
     The unconditional quantile regression (UQR) technique is employed to estimate earnings 
functions, with this technique being chosen to address the shortcomings associated with the 
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use of OLS, in two senses. The first is that OLS estimates the mean value conditional on the 
distribution of the dependent variable, with a concern arising if the conditional distribution of 
dependent variable is skewed, asymmetric, and/or does not have a unique mode. Using OLS 
estimates may not give robust results, this problem being common in the context of wage 
determination given the asymmetry in wage distributions.
19   
     A second attractive feature of (and the most important reason for us to use) unconditional 
quantile regression is that it provides a disaggregated picture of income distributions. This 
advantage is crucial to our analysis of student loans since repayment burdens must be highest 
for those in the lowest parts of the income distribution (Chapman and Lounkaew, 2010; 
Chapman et al., 2010), a feature which cannot be captured by the use of standard OLS. Thus 
we estimate age-income profiles for the 25
th, 50
th (median) and 75
th quantiles of income 
distributions by age, with separate estimations being carried out for males and females.
20  
     Our unconditional quantile regression method follows Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009), 
a technique which relies on a transformation known as re-centered influence function (RIF). 













 (19)  
  
 
 where   . I f  is the marginal density function of I where D is an indicator function. In practice 
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where  ˆ q  is the sample quantile and    ˆ
I f q  is the kernel density estimator, with this 
transformed variable being used in place of the original dependent variable. One crucial 
distinguishing feature of the UQR is that it provides us with a way to recover the marginal 
impact of the regressors on the unconditional quantile of I; in the context of this study it is the 
                                                 
19Many recent studies have used disaggregated approaches to analyse wage distribution and wage determination 
(Buchinsky, 1994; Machado and Mata, 2001). Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) uses unconditional quantile 
methods in a detailed exploration of wage distributions. 




marginal impact of additional years of potential experience on income of each income 
quantile. Usual inference procedures of the OLS are also applicable to the UQR estimates.  
 
V.  Data and Results 
 
     Statistical description of the data now follows with estimates of income distribution and 
the probabilities that a borrower experiences repayment hardships are reported in the second 
subsection. We then illustrate the levels of average and median repayment burdens for 
borrowers followed by disaggregated analyses of repayment burdens. The penultimate 
section examines the repayment burden of the extreme case of lawyers whose debts reach the 
life-time limit of Stafford loans.  
 
A. The CPS Data 
 
     Data  used  to  estimate  graduate  and  teacher age-earning profiles are from the Current 
Population Survey March Supplement 2009. However, a single CPS does not contain 
sufficient observations for law graduates and we therefore pool law graduates’ data from four 
March data sets: 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009.
21 The income information in the early year data 
sets have been adjusted by wage inflation of 3 per cent per annum
22 to obtain their 2010 
values. The CPS data contain information concerning sex, income, age, education, and 
employment status. Since we are interested in the calculation of repayment burdens of 
borrowers generally the age-income relationships are considered irrespective of employment. 
     Two groups of individuals have been omitted, the self-employed and individuals who are 
studying; the former because it is difficult to determine their incomes with any precision, and 
the latter because members of this group are not required to repay student loans (if they are 





                                                 
21 We exclude the 2006 data due to some data interpretation problems. When the 2006 data are pooled with the 
data in 2007 to 2009 some of the age-income profiles do not exhibit a regular empirical pattern of downward 
concavity, the cause of which is unclear; using the 2005 data, the age-income profiles behave as they are 
expected to. 
22 This is roughly the average of wage inflation in the period 1995-2009. 
 19 
 
B. Calculating the Probability of Repayment Hardships 
 
     What are the probabilities that borrowers are likely to experience hardships as a result of 
high repayment burdens? This is addressed by combining the calculations of loan repayments 
reported in Section III (as illustrated in Figure 1) with approximations of income distributions 
using the Singh-Maddala approach. Essentially we are presenting probabilities that young 
graduates will experience loan servicing difficultie defined as having repayment burdens 
equal to or in excess of 18 per cent. 
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FIGURE 2. PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF MALE AND FEMALE GRADUATE 




     For the denominator of Equation 1 we analyse income distribution data separately for 
males and females, and with respect to all graduates, teachers and all lawyers.
23 We assume 
that borrowers use the standard 10-year repayment plan, and borrowers are assumed to begin 
a four year degree at age 18 and graduate in the minimum time. For illustrative purposes a 
subset of the data is presented in Figure 2, the probability distributions of income for all male 
and female graduates aged 22 to age 25. 
      
TABLE 2−PROBABILITIES OF EXPERIENCING HIGH REPAYMENT BURDENS 







($)  1-2 3-4 
 
 
5-6 7-8  9-10 
Male:              
All graduates  20,000  ≤15,400  0.43 0.23 0.13 0.09 0.08 
Teachers 20,000  ≤15,400  0.64 0.27 0.09 0.08 0.04 
All lawyers 
(Standard) 
  100,000 
 




  100,000 
 
≤46,333  0.30 0.25 14.6  0.07*  0.00* 
Female:              
All graduates  20,000  ≤15,400 0.49  0.27  0.19 0.29  0.18 










≤46,333 0.45  0.30  0.26 0.16  0.20 
* We only calculate the proportion for the first 10 years of the extended repayment plan. 
     
As noted, and based on the literature reported in Section I, we use an 18 per cent 
repayment burden as the cut-off to calculate the proportion of borrowers classified as 
experiencing repayment hardships. To clarify our approach, the repayment requirement for a 
                                                 
23 There are insufficient data points for lawyers aged 22 to 31 to allow a disaggregation between those working 




debt size of $20,000 is about $230 per month or $2,762 per annum and for this debt there will 
be a repayment burden of at least 18 per cent when a borrower’s annual income is less than 
$15,400. The probabilities of experiencing high repayment burdens are shown in Table 2. 
     Under our debt assumptions and repayment hardship definition the most important results 
are as follows: 
(i)  The proportion of graduates whose incomes are at or below the cutoff is about 43-
49 per cent in the first two years after graduation, but decline subsequently to 
around 8-18 per cent in the last two years of repayment; 
(ii)  About 47-64 per cent of teachers are expected to experience repayment hardships 
in their first two years after graduation, a figure which falls to about 4-15 per cent 
by the last two years of repayment;  
(iii)  Due to the assumption of very high debts, and even given their relatively high 
incomes, the probability that law graduates using the standard repayment plan 
experience repayment hardships is about 80-82 per cent in the first two years after 
graduation, (about 40 percentage points more than for all graduates with average 
debt); 
(iv)  Even for the last two years of repayment, the proportion is still around 44-62 per 
cent for lawyers for standard repayments, which is about 4 to 5 times higher than 
is the case for a typical graduate; and 
(v)  The extended repayment arrangement (borrowers with debts exceeding $30,000 
are able to extend their repayment to a maximum period of 25 years) reduces the 
proportion of law graduates estimated to experience repayment difficulties to 30-
35 in the first two years after graduation and by the last two years of repayment, 
the proportion falls to zero for males and to about 20 per cent for females. 
 
C.  Repayment Burdens: The Use of Aggregate Analysis 
 
          The results reported above show an important aspect of the incidence of repayment 
burdens, the probability that graduates on average are likely to experience difficulties in 
meeting loan obligations. While this aspect of the exercise is very instructive, it does not 
show the level of repayment burdens experienced. There are two quite distinct approaches in 
an illustration of repayment burden levels, aggregated and disaggregated. As argued above 
much of the literature has focused on very broad calculations of repayment burdens, and this 
is where we begin. 
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FIGURE 3. MALE AND FEMALE OLS AGE-INCOME PROFILES 
 
     This  section  considers  average,  and  median, repayment burdens associated with the 
standard repayment plan
24 with respect to four groups of borrowers: all graduates, teachers, 
and law graduates working in the private and public sectors. Based on the income functions 
discussed in the previous section, we construct expected lifetime profiles separately for male 
and female for all graduates, graduates working as teachers, and law graduates. In addition, 
since career choices of law graduates are central to the policy issue it is instructive to 
compare the income paths of private and public sectors lawyers.  Figure 3 reports age-income 
profiles for graduates derived from OLS estimates of the earning functions. 
                                                 
24 Less than 6 per cent of borrowers choose to use graduated repayment (Choy and Carroll, 2006). 
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     Investigations  reveal  that  repayment burdens do not differ importantly between the 
Unsubsidized and Subsidized Stafford loans. As a result discussion in the ensuing section 
focuses only on the repayment burdens associated with Unsubsidized Stafford loans. 
     Average repayment burdens for average (OLS) and median income groups are shown in 
Table 3.  
TABLE 3−AVERAGE AND MEDIAN REPAYMENT BURDENS
*  
Male Female  Borrowers Debt 
level  Average Median Average Median 
All graduates  $20,000  0.07  0.04  0.09  0.05 
Teachers $20,000  0.11  0.06  0.12  0.06 
Private sector lawyers (Standard)  $100,000 0.11  0.10  0.12  0.11 
Public sector lawyers (Standard)  $100,000 0.22   0.16  0.29  0.21 
Private sector lawyers (Extended)  $100,000     0.06      0.05      0.06      0.06 
Public sector lawyers (Extended)  $100,000     0.11      0.09      0.15      0.11 
*   We only report the repayment burdens for the first 10 years of the extended repayment plan. 
 
     The major findings are as follows: 
(i)  Graduates’ average and median repayment burdens are around 7-9 and 4-5 per 
cent, which should be considered to be low and unproblematic; 
(ii)  Average and median teachers’ repayment burdens are around 11-12 and 6 per 
cent; 
(iii)  Private sector lawyers under the standard plan have repayment burdens of the 
order of 10-12 per cent for males and females; 
(iv)  However, the average and median repayment burdens under the standard 
repayment plan for public sector are as high as 16 to 22 per cent for males, and 
20-30 per cent for females; and 
(v)  The repayment burdens are reduced by half when the lawyers are placed under the 
extended repayment plan. 
 
     Overall the results do not reveal that repayment burdens are a serious problem, even when 
the debt is high, with the exception of public sector lawyers under the extended repayment 
plan. This, however, is not the case when patterns of repayment burdens and income 
asymmetry are taken into account. One of our most important contributions is to take these 
two elements into account and the following subsections illustrate empirically how both age 
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and income distributions critically affect our understanding of the importance of repayment 
burdens for quite different groups of graduates. 
 
D. The Real Situation of Repayment Burdens: Disaggregate Analysis 
 
     A major contribution of our exercise is to illustrate the great importance of disaggregated 
analyses of the data. Indeed, we contend that it is not possible to understand the breadth of 
the US loan repayment burden issue outside this context. Since standard repayment imposes 
the same repayment throughout the repayment period, the associated repayment burden is 
usually higher at the beginning of the period and declines as incomes rise. Critically, and in 
addition, individual repayment burdens depend on where borrowers lie in the income 
distribution. This is the reason that we now use unconditional quantile regressions of the age-
income profiles.
25    
     In section IIC we illustrated formally the effect of repayment burdens on occupational 
choice, relationships driven by the trade-offs inherent between salary and non-salary 
components of remuneration. While we are unable to test this directly, it is relatively 
straightforward to calculate differences in repayment burdens both between jobs, as done 
above in aggregate, and within job categories. 
     Unconditional  quantile  regressions  are  well suited to this task because they allow 
comparisons of repayment burdens for distributions of incomes at given ages for different job 
classifications. There are however, several limitations of the approach, one being the 
requirement for simplicity to limit the number of quantiles. We have chosen to use a very 
simple disaggregation into three income quantiles only: the 25
th (low), the 50
th (medium) and 
the 75
th (high). This has the implication of under-representing repayment burdens for those 
with very low incomes (less than the 25
th quantile) and over-representing the repayment 
burdens for those with very high inomces (greater than the 75
th quantile). 
     There are two steps to the process. First, we estimate unconditional quantile regressions 
for males and females with respect to: all graduates; teachers; private sector lawyers and 
public sector lawyers. To provide an illustration of the results Figure 4 shows age-earnings 
profiles by quantiles for all graduates.
26 
                  
                                                 
25 The unconditional quantile estimates of the earning functions are shown in the Appendix B. Illustrations of 
the age-income profiles for the remaining groups of borrowers are available from the authors. 
26 The other quantile regressions results are available from the authors. 
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FIGURE 4. MALE AND FEMALE GRADUATES’ UNCONDITIONAL QUANTILE AGE-
INCOME PROFILES 
 
     The main points from the quantile regressions are: 
(i)    For both males and females graduate incomes at the 25
th quantile are about 60 per 
cent of the median income, and incomes at the 75
th quantile are about 40 per cent 
higher than median incomes; 
(ii)   Teachers with income at the 25
th quantile earn about 75 per cent of median teacher 
income, and incomes for teachers at the 75
th quantile are about 20 per cent higher 
than teachers’ median incomes;   
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(iii)  The median income of male teachers is about 40 per cent lower than the median 
income of all male graduates, and female teacher median incomes are 20 per cent 
lower than the median income of all female graduates; 
(iv)   The median incomes of both male and female law graduates working in the private 
sector are both about 70 per cent higher than the median incomes of law graduates 
working in the public sector; 
(v)  Law graduates working in the private sector at the 25
th quantile receive incomes 
which are 60 per cent lower than the median incomes for this group. Incomes at the 
75
th quantile  are about 60 per cent higher than median income for this group of law 
graduates; and 
(vi)   Law graduates working in the public sector at the 25
th income quantile receive about 
70 per cent of the median income of this group. Incomes at the 75
th quantile are 
about 40 per cent times higher than their median income. 
 
     The second step in the process involves the calculation of repayment burdens for all age 
and sex income quantiles computed for each job, using the loan obligations presented in 
Section IIIB and employed to illustrate the aggregate burdens shown in Section VC. There 
are several ways to present these results, and a graphical example shows what the repayment 
burdens look like for all job groups at the 25
th income quantile (Q25). We have chosen this 
part of the distribution since it is at Q25 that the burdens are at their highest. 
     From Figure 5 it can be seen that repayment burdens decline with age, which is a result of 
a combination of higher incomes with age and falling per period loan servicing obligations in 
real terms. The most significant points apparent from the Figure are: 
(i)  For young low income graduates, irrespective of job, repayment burdens are 
around or above our cut-off of difficulty of 18 per cent (at the lowest they are 13-
14 per cent for female graduates in aggregate and teachers, and 16-20 per cent for 
comparable males); 
(ii)  The repayment burdens for low income public sector lawyers using the standard 
repayment plan are extremely high, at around 60 and 77 per cent for males and 
females; and 
(iii)  Repayment burdens for low income private sector lawyers using the standard 
repayment plan are much lower than is the case for the public sector, but are still 














































     Highly disaggregated results are shown in Table 4 which has columns for the maximum 








TABLE 4−REPAYMENT BURDENS BY INCOME QUANTILE
a 







th        0.16*      0.09       0.13      0.08 
50




th        0.04      0.03       0.05      0.03 
25
th        0.20**      0.11       0.16*      0.11 
50




th        0.07      0.05       0.06      0.04 
25
th        0.43**      0.21**       0.32**      0.19** 
50




th        0.11      0.07        0.11      0.07 
25
th        0.60**      0.31**       0.77**      0.39** 
50




th        0.15      0.11       0.21**      0.14 
25
th        0.25**      0.12       0.19**      0.12 
50




th        0.07      0.04       0.07      0.04 
25
th        0.38**      0.19**       0.46**      0.23** 
50




th        0.10      0.07       0.13      0.08 
a    Debt level is $20,000 for typical graduates and teachers; $100,000 for lawyers. 
b    Refers to the highest repayment burdens in any one year after graduation. 
c    We only report  the average repayment burdens for the first 10 years of the extended repayment plan. 
*   Repayment burden exceeds 15 per cent. 
** Repayment burden exceeds 18 per cent. 
 
There are several additional important points from the data of Table 4: 
(i)    For graduates and teachers at the median and 75
th quantiles, repayment burdens do 
not pose serious problems since at their maximum they are only 7  per cent; 
(ii)   Lawyers with median income under the standard repayment plan still face burdens of 
19 to 35 per cent, which exceeds the 18 per cent difficulty benchmark; 
(iii)  For lawyers using the extended repayment plan the maximum repayment burdens 
fall by about 45 per cent. Yet for lawyers in Q25 the burdens remain very high, from 
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25 to 38 per cent for males in the private and public sectors, and 19 to 46 per cent for 
females in the private and public sectors.  
 
E. Illustrating the Extreme Repayment Burden Case: Public Sector Lawyers 
 
          This final empirical section considers the extreme situation in which the amounts 
borrowed have reached the Stafford life-time limit of $138,500, a real situation for lawyers 
graduating from a high cost private university (Schrag, 2007). The repayment burdens are 
reported in Table 5 for different types of lawyers under both the standard and extended 
repayment plans.  
 
TABLE 5. REPAYMENT BURDENS OF LOW INCOME LAWYERS WITH MAXIMUM 
DEBT* 






Private sector lawyers  Standard
  0.49** 0.25** 0.38** 0.23** 
Public sector lawyers  Standard
  0.76** 0.38** 0.93** 0.47** 
Private sector lawyers  Extended  0.29**     0.15  0.23**     0.14 
Public sector lawyers  Extended  0.46**     0.23**  0.56**   0.28** 
We only report average repayment burdens for the first 10 years of the extended repayment plan. 
*   Repayment burden exceeds 15 per cent. 
** Repayment burden exceeds 18 per cent. 
 
     It is quite clear from Table 5 that the repayment burdens faced by high-debt lawyers on 
the standard repayment plan and with low incomes greatly exceed the 18 per cent benchmark, 
and they are as high as 76-93 per cent the case of public sector lawyers, and 38 to 49 per cent 
for those in the private sector. Repayment burdens for lawyers in the extended repayment 
plan fall by about 40 per cent, but are still as high as 46-56 per cent for those in the public 
sector, and even as high as 23-30 per cent for those in the private sector. The lowest 
calculation or burdens for low income lawyers is the average annual obligation of 14-15 per 
cent for those in the private sector, and even this relatively benign calculation is very close to 





F.  Discussion of the Findings 
 
     The previous two sections have illustrated the importance of income paths and income 
distributions in determining repayment burdens. Analysis based on average (or median) 
income show modest burdens only, but they do not capture the hardships faced by graduates 
with low incomes. The more interesting quantile regression analysis shows very marked 
differences to the aggregated situation, and in some cases the repayment burdens are 
extremely high indeed. It follows that some groups of graduates face repayment burdens 
which are so harsh that they must be deterred from pursuing less well-paid jobs, such as 





     There are profound problems associated with US student loans policy which can be traced 
in large measure to the expected difficulties faced by many students in repaying their debts. 
While so-called “repayment burdens” are examined in the student financing literature we 
have extended the analyses through a formal modeling approach in the context of career 
choices. As well, we have analyzed very broad ranges of expected lifetime earnings 
distributions by job and this has provide new insights into the meaning and importance of 
repayment burdens. There are several important findings from these broadly-based empirical 
applications. 
     The  most  important  and  obvious  of  these in concept are that anticipated repayment 
burdens are a function of loan size, interest rates, expected incomes and students’ time 
preferences. In empirical terms it can be shown that a significant proportion of student 
debtors can expect to face repayment difficulties in a situation in which many assess with 
accuracy the probability that they will experience labor market situations that place them in 
the lowest parts of the graduate earnings distributions. We show also that there are critical 
differences in the impact of repayment burdens associated with career choices: in particular, 
public sector lawyers are likely to be in situations in which anticipated repayment burdens are 
such as to make this type of employment quite difficult in material terms and, thus for many, 
undesirable. It follows that occupational choices will be influenced, perhaps critically, by the 
design of student loans. 
     The  conceptual  modeling  and  the  empirical results suggest that typical student loan 
schemes which require set repayments on the basis of time, such as Stafford loans, are 
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inevitably compromised because of their lack of capacity to take into account the future 
financial situation of student debtors. Income contingent loan schemes, now in operation in 
many OECD countries, avoid these problems because repayment burdens have maximum 
repayment levels set as parameters. It is not a surprise that there have been attempts to move 
the US student loan systems towards income contingent collection, but it is still an important 
question as to whether the current compromises in this direction are sufficient to address what 
is required (Chapman and Shavit, 2010). 
     Our modeling has several limitations. One is that, apart from with respect to lawyers, we 
have not as yet explored repayment burdens for Stafford loan users with extremely high debt 
levels, and there is little doubt that the problems raised in our analysis are significantly 
understated for a small group of potential students. Two, while our use of unconditional 
income quantiles is a major improvement over the use of either average graduate earnings or 
hypothetical income scenarios, so far we have focused on cross-sectional data only. An 
improved way to proceed would be the use of panel earnings information which allows a 
relaxation of the implicit restriction inherent from cross section data that individuals remain 

































Male Female  Variable 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
University graduate (Age 22-60)      
Total annual income ($)  73,249  64,562  44,575  39,543 
Age  40.5 10.2 39.7 10.4 
N  8,009 8,986 
Teacher (Age 22-60)      
Total annual income ($)  42,691  19,707  33,823  21,229 
Age  38.6 10.3 39.8 10.7 
N  378 1,332 
Law graduate (Age 25-54)      
Total annual income ($)  165,153  132,518  124,771  112,984 
Age    40.6 7.9 38.1 7.8 






TABLE B1−INCOME FUNCTIONS FOR ALL GRADUATES 
Male Female   



















































2  0.0624 0.1023 0.1003 0.0589 0.0207 0.0158 0.0421 0.0397 
N  8,009 8,986 
 *Significant at 10 per cent level of confidence 










TABLE B2−INCOME FUNCTIONS FOR TEACHERS  
Male Female   



















































2  0.0977 0.1470 0.1036 0.0869 0.0246 0.0072 0.0197 0.0359 
N  378 1,332 
 *Significant at 10 per cent level of confidence 












TABLE B3−INCOME FUNCTIONS FOR PRIVATE LAWYERS  
Male Female   



















































2  0.1114 0.0964 0.0714 0.0383 0.0468 0.0475 0.0468 0.0392 
N  549 345 
*Significant at 10 per cent level of confidence 














TABLE B4−INCOME FUNCTIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR LAWYERS 
Male Female   



















































2  0.1830 0.2088 0.0928 0.0687 0.1260 0.2507 0.1892 0.1242 
N  189 134 
 *Significant at 10 per cent level of confidence.  
**Significant at 5 per cent level of confidence 
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